Firstly, the article focuses on the ideologies of Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt, which are, as a matter of stereotype, considered as being in opposition to each other. By revealing the logics of Kelsenian normativism and the conception of law presupposed therein, the paper aims at re-constructing the opposition into a generative affinity of two ideologies and showing that these two great ideological adversaries of the first half of the twentieth century could be considered co-authors of the same ideological construct. The construct could be called the total state of exception, with the inherent political holism and legal nihilism.
external/outside world. This world is completely empty/pure of law/legality; in this world we are pure sensing, physically existing beings. As Kelsen writes, The external fact whose objective meaning is legal or illegal act is always an event that can be perceived by senses (because it occurs in time and space) and therefore a natural phenomenon determined by causality. However, this event as such, as an element of nature, is not an object of legal cognition. What turns this event into a legal or illegal act is not its physical existence, determined by the laws of causality prevailing in nature, but the objective meaning resulting from its interpretation. The specifically legal meaning of this act is derived from a "norm" whose content refers to the act; this norm confers legal meaning to the act, so that it may be interpreted according to this norm. 2 Here we are confronted with two parallel worlds existing beside each other, very strictly separated, with no possibilities of any overlap, but strangely reciprocal; the existence of a norm as parallelism in the internal world changes the quality of what is paralleled in the external world. What is also important here is that in this 1 In this respect, it is hard to agree with the rather common statements -however persuasive -that Kelsen"s goal is a pure science of law: it is not a theory of pure law. He envisages no such chimera as a "pure norm" (see M.D.A. Freeman, ed., Lloyd's Introduction to Jurisprudence, 6 th edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1994), p. 273; therein multiple other authors are referred to). Not only his norm is pure of physis (see also infra note 12), his goal, especially as related to the first edition of Reine Rechtslehre, was also to purify norm (make it autonomous) of physis, the latter especially taking the form of all what is related to politics and ethics/morality (see David … and actual behavior are not identical, though the one may be equal to the other". 5 The exclusion of the possibility of identity clearly functions as an exclusion of the possibility of the overlap of two separated worlds; but what is equality between them? This articulation hardly adds to the clarification of the margin between the two worlds -they remain two pure self-exclusive co-existing worlds.
The agenda of the exclusion of the world of facts/nature/senses from the world of law is implemented even in the world of reason itself to which the world of law belongs. This is initiated by the differentiation of natural (or causal) science and social (or normative) sciences. 6 In other words, even in the world of reason, law/normativity has to be distanced from nature as far as possible. As Kelsen states,
By limiting the science of law to the cognition and description of legal norms and to the norm-constituted relations between the norm-determined facts, the law is delimited against nature, and the science of law as a science of norms is delimited against all other sciences that are directed toward causal cognition of actual happenings. Thereby a criterion has been ascertained according to which ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2010 103 society can be clearly differentiated from nature, and social science from natural science. 7 This differentiation is accomplished by the exchange of the principles, as being in our thinking, by which we know two different objects of cognition. Using
Kantian metaphors, the glasses through which we know society have to be different from the glasses through which we know nature; but both of them are found in the domain of reason. The principle which stands as a tool of cognition for the natural sciences is causality. On the other hand, according to Keslen, social science together with the science of law, which have as their object society (not nature) as a normative order of human behavior and which aims at being different from natural sciences, has to know this object According to a principle entirely different from that of causality. … If we succeed in proving that such principle exists in our thinking and is applied by the sciences that have as their object mutual human behavior as determined by norms … then we are entitled to consider society as an order or system different from that of nature and the sciences concerned with society as different from natural sciences. 8 According to Kelsen, "the principle, different from causality that we apply when describing normative order of human behavior, may be called imputation." The rule of law does not say, as the law of nature does: when A is, "is" B; but when A is, B "ought" to be … . The reason for the different meaning of the connection of elements in the rule of law and in the rule of nature is that the connection described in the rule of law is brought about by a legal authority (that is, by a legal norm created by an act of will), whereas the connection of cause and effect is independent from such human interference. 10 This anthropocentric mode of thinking is followed by the further rejection of natural law:
Metaphysical theory of law pretends to discover a natural law immanent to nature. From the point of view of a scientific view of the world, however, within which only a positivistic theory of law can be established, the difference between 7 Ibid., p. Kelsen humiliates science (natural causality should be rejected, especially for the purpose to reject metaphysics in law), but afterwards hides under its allegedly nonmetaphysical prestige. Also -he pretends to escape metaphysics, but becomes even more metaphysical than the "metaphysics" that he states to be escaping.
But the anthropocentric paradigm is perfected and the mechanism of exclusionary inclusion of life into the realm of law finally accomplished by the concept of the Grundnorm, which appears as the essential margin (or, speaking more metaphorically, the gate) between two worlds. After the exclusion of life from the realm of law through the aforementioned mechanisms, it is included back therein through the "gate" of the Grundnorm, which has the empowering of the omni-potent sovereign as its sole and only purpose.
Before concentrating on the peak/marginal conception of Grundorm, first of all, we have to keep in mind that in this pure 12 a-priori world of normativity (law as a system of norms or as a normative order) 13 there is some hierarchy of an analytical character. Any norm (apart from the one -Grundnorm) receives its legal character from another norm, which, using spatial metaphorical employed by Kelsen, is "higher" (quotation marks are used by Kelsen himself). 14 The only norm which is not empty variable is the Grundnorm. For the Grundnorm, having power has a substantial meaning. In some sense, all norms are contained in the Grundnorm as its predicates (i.e. Kelsenian system of norms is essentially one construct of analytical a-priori relations), but only as concerns their validity/power, which for the Grundnorm is a substantial element (that of contents), but for the other norms, only that of a form. We could say metaphorically that the Grundorm contains all of the legal validity/power which is distributed to the "lower" norms formalizing/positing them in the system of law. That is how the static system -the Kelsenian pyramid -is formed/posited, which is the system of the distribution of legal power/validity and nothing more. But because of some specific and substantial character of the Grundnorm, making all norms that are "lower" to
Grundnorm empty variables, the whole system becomes dynamic. This specific character of the Grundnorm is explained by its main definition, being also the most important sentence of the Pure Theory of Law: "the presupposed basic norm contains nothing but the determination of a norm creating fact, the authorization of a norm-creating authority … ". 16 The content of Grundnorm is only the authorization of a norm-creating authority (who should appear as the omni-potent law-giver sovereign), who may create norms of any content whatsoever, thus making the system of norms dynamic.
We may conceive this Kelsenian power-full content-less normativity 17 as the framework and foundation for the total state of exception; i.e., the Kelsenian system of law is founded on the total exclusion of physis in order to include it into 15 Cf. Carl Schmitt, Legality and Legitimacy, trans. Through this change, the way was open to an absolutely "neutral," value-and quality-free, formalfunctional concept of legality without content"). Also cf. Hans Kelsen, supra note 2, p. 198 ("a legal norm is not valid because it has a certain content, that is, because its content is logically deducible from a presupposed basic norm, but because it is created in a certain way -ultimately in a way determined by a presupposed basic norm"). 16 Ibid., p. 196. 17 It might be contended that Kelsen"s idea was, exactly, that "legal science has no contribution to make in answering questions about how the content of law should be shaped" (David Dyzenhaus, supra note 1, p. 106 [italics -TB]). I.e. the content-less-ness of law is allegedly the matter/problem of legal science, not law; however, it appears to be the clear subterfuge. This science, which in itself is just a theory/vision of law, presents normativity/law as content-less -it states that law, as a matter of fact, is content-less. What is camouflaged here is that by having no contribution in answering the question of the content of law, this vision of law already programs political holism, legal nihilism, completely other vision of law and might be related to what Schmitt calls "the degeneration of the concept of law" (Carl Schmitt, supra note 15, p. 79; see further this paper, especially Part 4); as a consequence, in our vision, the law is changed and, thus, it is the matter of law, not only legal science. On the other hand, what is contrasted with legal science is not so much law, but politics, what in itself presupposes that, even in Kelsenian view, law is as politics, also, as a consequence, making the opposition itself (i.e. legal science v. politics) the political one; see David Dyzenhaus, supra note 1, p. 109 ("Kelsen … never properly dealt with the obvious counterclaim which Schmitt and others might make -… that the presupposition that there is a distinction between politics and a science of law is itself political").
As we also see from this passage, the Grundnorm does not belong to the positive legal order and is not a positive norm -it is something outside that order as some act of will. But it is also not some concrete/factual willing/deciding sovereign and does not presuppose one. The Kelsenian sovereign is virtual/imagined and still "exists" in the internal world -the one of logos. That could be the place to draw more attention to the ideas of Schmitt.
SCHMITT'S THEORY OF SOVEREIGNTY AS SUPPLEMENTING KELSEN'S THEORY OF LAW TO ITS POSITIVISTIC PERFECTION
Schmitt"s theory of sovereignty 22 and Kelsen"s theory of law present essentially identical models of exclusionary-inclusion of life into the domain of law.
On the other hand, through Kelsen"s ideas we can better understand Schmitt"s theory of sovereignty as the model of exclusionary-inclusion of life into the legal- "real face" of positivism, because of which we may even give it the title of legal nihilism, 28 Schmitt articulates this ideology to its completion. Precisely in the Schmittean perspective it becomes very clear that "there is no such thing as law in positivist sense" 29 (i.e. all is politics; positivism is political holism), and that "the positivist conception says that legal order is just the instrument of the powerful" 30 .
Schmitt explains how this instrumentality appears, and that is completed in his theory of sovereignty. 23 More precisely, the factual/external world is excluded from the normative/internal world; i.e. the vector of exclusion, at least initially, is one-directional, not both-directional. 24 Here the well known affiliation of Schmitt with Nazi regime is had in mind. 25 We can talk about the still flourishing Kelsenism in some regions and impact (direct or indirect) Cf. ibid., p. 13 ("both elements, the norm as well as the decision, remain within the framework of the juristic"). 37 Hans Kelsen, supra note 2, p. 9. 38 Cf. Carl Schmitt, supra note 18, p. 13 (monopoly to coerce and to rule is not monopoly to decide), 17 ("power proves nothing in law"). It may also be stated that this anthropocentric paradigm of the world of politics and law is also to be founded, as applied, in Kelsen"s approach. For example, see David Dyzenhaus, supra note 1, p. 104 ("Kelsen wanted to emphasize above all that law is a product or creation of earth-bound human beings who have the power to determine the content of positive law"). The problem is that the stemming of this thesis from his Pure Theory of Law is far from being evident. The paradigm of this work is rather strange -it is logocentric, but very arguably it is anthropocentric. The reason here is, in some sense, pure of a human, especially as a physical being.
MODERN DEMOCRACY AS THE FORM OF A TOTAL STATE
The pronoun "he" in Schmitt"s statement "sovereign is he who decides on exception" 44 is used clearly to refer to the Donoso Cortesian aspect of personalized decisionism. But if it is de-personalized (for example, instead of "he" we write "the one"), then the formula perfectly fits the modern democratic/elected-by-people legislator (law-giver). In some sense, there is no theoretical difference here, and presupposing that the dictator is not exactly the people, and even not the majority of people, but only those, who succeed in winning the elections; and that factually may be (and usually is) a minority of people. It should also be stated that the fact that United Kingdom has very specific relation with constitution, which is still allegedly unwritten, here it is probably more evident that the dictatorship is still more proper word to generalize the form of government.
where the norm is an empty variable at its discretion, when the state of exception is total. On the other hand, for the totality of the regulation to be realized it is sufficient that what is unregulated should be regulatable at any time (or should linger in the potentiality of regulation). The contemporary democratic sovereign"s acting in a total state of exception, where anything could be regulated, leads to a total regulation of life and the contemporary state (regional juris-diction) and even the whole world (global juris-diction) more and more takes the form of a total state or camp in Agambenian terms. 48 This total state has two coin-sides as its characteristics: (1) one is related to the total un-regulated-ness of life as the lingering of regulated-ness in potentiality: our life is more and more similar to the life of the main personage of Kafka"s Der Process; it is left more and more bare in relationship to the unpredictability of law 46 On the other hand, in modern democracy, the dictator of law is, theoretically, human as such / abstract human in the form of People. In some sense, there is the opposition between the anthropocentric/modern law and the law, given by the saint sovereign ("he"), who, as it is/was conceived, does not give law, but just pronounces it, which exists in itself as some eternal, natural, independent, substantive, concrete law (i.e. still not degenerated law). In this respect, Schmitt"s decisionism presupposes fundamental inner oscillation between (1) juspositivism, which, at the same time, presupposes anthropocentrism and logocentrism (here we should have in mind the notion that decision probably is not the element of pure state of nature and it is not some kind of pure violence/power; it is more Derridian interpretative violence, something like "imaginary will") and (2) jusnaturalism (here we should start from the question what Schmitt has in mind when he speaks about the degeneration of law? What is the opposite of the degenerated law?). 47 In this context it should be noted that procedural/formal constitution (i.e. providing with the scheme of government) puts no limits in this respect, and that this and the dreadful potentiality of un-regulated-ness; law can be changed in any direction at any time and legal officials can knock at your door at any time; 49 (2) the other side is related to the total actual regulated-ness of life: it was never so regulated as it is today, and the zone of its un-regulated-ness essentially narrowed to a zero point, especially during the last one hundred years:
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, government was mainly concerned with law and order, external affairs and defence, and raising revenue to finance these activities. By the end of the twentieth century, there were few areas not only of public but also of personal life in which government performed no role.
50
But although an elected legislative body for Schmitt is central, it definitely is not the only one form/facet of contemporary law-giver/sovereign. He differentiates three more -(1) people when they legislate ("give law") directly; (2) so-called substantial/material part of constitution (human rights) together with third branch of government essentially involved not only in their implementation, but still in its creative process, rather seldom hidden under the cliché of interpretation; (3) President as, firstly, the personal law-giver and, also very importantly, the main organ of the second branch of government.
51
Concerning the first above-mentioned law-giver -people"s direct legislature through plebiscitary procedure -this is the form of so-called direct democracy which is rather crucially criticized and neglected in contemporary theory of public law as an ineffective and even, in some sense, wrong form of government/rule.
52
Schmitt is also critical about that; 53 therefore, we leave it aside here. What is important for us here is the second above-mentioned law-giver and some aspects related to the third. We should concentrate now not on the issue that Schmitt prefers a President (a Donoso Cortesian dictator) instead of Parliament as the ultimate law-giver, 54 but we should emphasize one important reason why he does so. This reason could be summarized by his phrase "the degeneration of the concept of law"
55
. This degeneration is up till now the main concern for all of us. 49 That is reinforced by the general principle of the contemporary law -"ignorance of law does not release from legal responsibility". ; some statements in other parts of the book are even more interesting from the critical perspective; for example, see ibid., p. 89 ("… The people can only respond yes or no. They cannot advise, deliberate, or discuss. They cannot govern or administer. They also cannot set norms, but can only answer with yes or no to a question placed before them. …") 54 Ibid., p. 83. That is usually followed up by the negative critique of Schmitt. 55 Ibid., p. 79.
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RIGHTS AND/OR (?) NATURAL LAW
As put into the context, the problem of the degeneration of law is presented, firstly, as one of constitutional theory, constitutional law and public law. 56 Secondly, it is the issue/problem because There are rarely today any parliamentary majorities that still seriously believe that their statutory decisions will be valid "in perpetuity." The situation is so incalculable and so abnormal that the statutory norm is losing its former character and becoming a mere measure.
57
In other words, here we are confronted with the erosion of the fundamentality of law. And not only at the parliamentary level is the situation this way abnormal.
That is valid also at the constitutional level by the recognition of the constitutional legalism as an error. For example, it may be stated that constitutional arrangements have the provisional character, as "the object of [constitutional] regulation -the activity of governing -is interminable", therefore, ever changing and requiring constitutional adaptation. 58 Of course, this sudden awakening in the light of an error was already programmed by the previously discussed Kelsenian normativism: there is nothing perpetual in the positive/posited pyramid of norms, apart from the Grundorm, which only perpetually empowers/authorizes law-giver (or norm-creating authority) by containing all power.
59
But there is one Last Bastion which apparently still disallows this degeneration of law and the domination of the total state. These are so-called , 2002) ). But theoretically we may say the same about any gun or, for example, bomb -there is nothing wrong with them when they lay in peace. This argument completely misconceives what is expected from law at the very fundamental level. The function of law (or right in a more archaic sense) is to protect from evil/wrong by always being right; in a more analytical sense, right is not (and may be not) wrong; otherwise it is a misuse of language. There can be no potentiality of evilness in law/right, and exactly this potentiality was implanted therein (especially, as theoretically coherent/acceptable potentiality) by legal positivism together with all its concern for only procedure of law-giving and the form, but not substance, of law. 60 The error of constitutional legalism should be more associated with the so called formal/procedural part of constitution, not the substantial/material one. 61 It is the dawn of modernity, especially as related to the formulation of the social contract theories. . Secondly, to understand this space it is necessary, as already mentioned, to unseal the closed gate between political-legal philosophy and epistemology in order to reconstruct what happened in modernity, and especially its dawn, with the fundamental fracture in law -natural law"s (initially being the one or dominant conception of law) fracture into the socalled scientific law and humanitarian law, the latter eventually taking the form of the political law, and the former receding into the political exile. Only there rests the one path back/forth -which in the end should take the form of ontology -to amodernity and another state/world/life, and until it is not done/gone, the total state of exception remains posited for the total regulation of life.
CONCUSIONS

1.
Kelsenian norms, what concerns their substantial contents/meaning, are empty variables (or, interpretables), and this aspect makes the Kelsenian system of norms that of pure legality, without legitimacy. The only norm, which is not empty variable, is Grundnorm. For Grundnorm, having of the power has a substantial meaning. However, the holder of this power (the primary interpreter) is indiscernible.
2. Kelsenian system of law is founded on the total exclusion of physis in order to include it into its domain as any possible content, and, therefore, may be conceived as representing the mechanism analogous to the one of the state of exception.
dictatorship) or other forms of law-giving. In the latter case, the last paragraph of the Chapter 5 of Legality and Legitimacy is crucial. There the main idea is simple -if there is no distinction between statute and measure and essentially all legal norms are mere measures, i.e. if the substantiality of law is washed-up, then lets choose the measure-making (that is the correct title of the law-making in this context) of the President ("dictator") as better conforming "to the essence of the administrative state" (Carl Schmitt, supra note 15, p. 82-83). On the other hand, his second decision remains, in some sense, dependent on the first decision or, more exactly, apparently remaining undecidability in that instance; at least some places in Legality and Legitimacy suggest that his second decision would have been more well-founded if the first decision would have been another, i.e. more favorable to jusnaturalism. 79 Cf. ibid., p. 14 ("how the systematic unity and order can suspend itself in a concrete case is difficult to construe, and yet it remains a juristic problem as long as the exception is distinguishable from a juristic chaos, from any kind of anarchy" [italics -TB]) 80 Giorgio Agamben, supra note 22, p. 29.
